On 17 March, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a law on the “special status” of Donbass, as established in Minsk II. [56] Later, in 2019, the Ukrainian parliament voted thursday to extend rules providing for limited autonomy to separatist-controlled eastern regions, a precondition for an agreement to resolve the five-year conflict there. [57] The law was immediately criticized by Ukrainian politicians, separatist leaders, and the Russian government. Radical Party leader Oleh Lyashko said the law was “a vote for de facto recognition of the Russian occupation in Donbass.” Parliament Deputy Speaker Andriy Parubiy said the law was “not for Putin or the occupiers,” but to show Europe that Ukraine is ready to respect Minsk II. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the law was a “clear break with the Minsk agreements.” [56] Representatives of the LPR and DPR said that the law was a “unilateral” amendment to Minsk II and that the agreement was annulled by this amendment. [58] DPR leader Alexander Zakharchenko said that any amendment in Minsk II that was not agreed upon was “legally void” and that “nothing agreed in Minsk was implemented.” He added that the DPR must “occupy all the cities where the referendum took place, and then cooperate politically [with Ukraine] as equal partners.” [59] Nevertheless, representatives of the DPR and LPR continued to submit peace proposals to the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine. [60] Ukrainian Defense Minister Stepan Poltorak said August 8. By June 2015, more than 100 soldiers and at least 50 civilians had been killed since Minsk II came into effect. According to him, pro-Russian forces had violated the ceasefire more than 4,000 times. [61] Contrary to the agreement, DPR representative Denis Pushilin and LPR representative Vladislav Deinego declared on June 10, 2015 that their republics “want to join the Russian Federation.” In addition, they said they considered Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in March 2014, to be part of Russia. [62] Here is an overview of the agreements signed in Minsk in 2014 and 2015.
A summit meeting was scheduled for February 11 at the Independence Palace in Minsk, the capital of Belarus, to discuss the implementation of the German-French diplomatic plan. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President François Hollande, DPR chief Alexander Zakharchenko and LVR leader Igor Plotnitsky participated. The negotiations lasted sixteen hours into the night and were described by the German Foreign Minister as “very difficult”. [31] [32] Following the talks, it was announced on February 12 that the parties to the conflict had agreed on a new set of peacebuilding measures. [25] Some of the agreed measures were an unconditional ceasefire observed by the OSCE from February 15, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front, the release of prisoners of war, and constitutional reform in Ukraine. [33] In the two weeks following the signing of the Minsk Agreements, both sides to the conflict frequently violated the ceasefire. [9] [10] Talks continued in Minsk and a follow-up to the Minsk Protocol was agreed on September 19, 2014. The memorandum clarified the implementation of the Protocol. Among the agreed peacemaking measures are:[9][11],[12] Amid a sharp decline in violence, the four agreements agreed in Normandy on October 2 held a meeting on October 2 following an agreement on the resumption of the implementation of Minsk II.
At the meeting, it was agreed that elections in the conflict zone would be held in accordance with Minsk II. [71] To achieve this, French President François Hollande said the elections should be postponed to 2016 because it would take three months to prepare for them. [71] Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to use his influence to prevent the DPR and LPR from holding early elections. [71] As a result, the DPR and the LPR announced on October 6 that their scheduled elections had been postponed to February 21, 2016. [72] Local elections were held in the rest of Ukraine on October 25, 2015. After the postponement, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said that if OSCE observers verified that the planned elections in the separatist zones were in accordance with Ukrainian law and Minsk II, the “special status law” for these areas would enter into force immediately. [73] The agreement was developed by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, composed of representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE. [6] The group was established in June to facilitate dialogue and conflict resolution in eastern and southern Ukraine. Meetings of the group were held with informal representatives of the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk People`s Republics on 31 July, 26 August, 1 September and 5 September 2014.
The details of the agreement signed on 5 September 2014 were largely similar to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko`s “fifteen-point peace plan” of 20 June. The following representatives signed the document:[7] Representatives of Russia, Ukraine, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the leaders of two pro-Russian separatist regions signed a 13-point agreement in Minsk in February 2015. The leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine met there at the same time and issued a statement of support for the agreement. But despite Russia`s efforts, Minsk-2 was not only the product of strong pressure on Ukraine. It also marked the shameful collapse of the Novorossiya project. Confusing predictions in Moscow in the spring of 2014.59 only a few Ukrainians have set their sights on Russia. On the contrary, the Ukrainians retaliated en masse, probably killing several hundred Russian soldiers and irregulars60, and almost invaded the DNR/LNR until they were arrested by the Russian army in Ilovaisk and, to a lesser extent, in Debaltseve. By fighting, they have created a toxic problem for Russia, whose leaders still insist that it is not at war with its neighbor and that russians and Ukrainians are “one people.” In early 2015, Russia might have had little doubt that even if it inflicted massive sacrifices on Ukraine, it would itself suffer heavy losses. It was a price their leaders did not want to pay for sensitive domestic political reasons – as evidenced by the harassment of Russian journalists and activists investigating the issue, and the classification of data that testifies to Russian victims in peacetime “special operations.” [61] Ukraine could not destroy Russia`s proxy, but Russia was not ready to support another high-intensity war with Ukraine; Ukraine could not win, but its willingness to fight for its sovereignty made Russia think.62 The implications for Ukrainian foreign policy would be far-reaching. A neutrality clause in the Constitution would prevent NATO membership.56 Nevertheless, the DNR and the NRL could sign agreements with other countries (e.g.B.
Russia) and perhaps establish Russian military bases on their territory.57 New doubts would also affect European integration. Acceptance of Russia`s demands could weaken the central authorities in Kiev to such an extent that the implementation of the Federal Foreign Office would be impossible. As fighting raged in Debaltseve, emergency negotiations took place in Minsk, mediated by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President François Hollande. The result was a “set of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements” (“Minsk-2”). .