The court then began its analysis. With respect to Rule 1.11(a), Casey did not deny that he had participated “personally and substantially” in the case being arbitrated. With respect to rule 1.11(b), Casey did not deny receiving “confidential information from the government.” As a result, Casey acknowledged that he was “personally barred from participating in the proceedings because Rule 1.11 is not limited to cases where the government agency itself is a party.” Rule 1.11(c) provides that if a former government prosecutor is disqualified because he or she acquired “government confidences” in the course of his or her public service (as Casey did here), the law firm with which the disqualified lawyer is affiliated may take over or continue to represent him or her in the government confidences case,” “only if the disqualified lawyer is appropriate and effective from any participation in any participation in the confidential information of the government. of the material is protected”, as set out in Rule 1.11(b). Citing this wording, the petitioners claimed that Casey was not “examined in a timely and effective manner” and that Kobre & Kim was not “promptly and reasonably examined.” to notification . Lawyers. within the company. Implement effective screening procedures. and “for written notice” to the U.S. Attorney`s Office, all of which are required by Rule 1.11(b). In explaining this point, Yates J. noted that commentary 3 to Rule 1.11 is a partial warning: Yates J.
noted that the Court, in Solow v.R. Grace & Co., 83 NY2d 303 (1994), rejected a per se rule of disqualification based on presumed trusts, arguing that a rule in itself is “unnecessarily excluding, because it indiscriminately disqualifies all members of a law firm, whether or not they share knowledge of a former client`s trust and secrets. The Kassis court had also rejected a disqualification per se of a law firm, stating that there was a presumption of common trust and that a party who wanted to avoid disqualification had to bear the “heavy burden” of proving that all information received from the disqualified lawyer was “unlikely to be significant or important in the dispute”. If and only if the party opposing the disqualification discharges this burden, the company could continue – and even then, the Kassis court said: Judge Yates then considered the applicants` argument that small business screening is never available. In particular, the applicants argued that the presumption of confidential information inadvertently shared or disclosed cannot be overcome in a law firm where a small number of lawyers necessarily meet and interact. (Kobre & Kim had between 33 and 40 lawyers in four different locations, including about 20 in the New York office working on the same floor as Casey. The petitioners referred to a “small law firm.”) The applicants cited Kassis and various other cases in support of their arguments, but the court stated that none of the cases cited constituted a rule per se against screening in a small enterprise. Size is a “contributing factor” in disqualification decisions, Justice Yates said, but cases where disqualification was granted also have “aggravating factors.” He continued: The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted this rule on January 20, 2004. It entered into force on 1 March 2004 and has not been amended since. This rule is identical to the ABA model rule of Prof`l Conduct 1.11 (2013). A lawyer who has entered the public service through the revolving door is also not allowed to deal with cases in which the lawyer has been “personally and substantially” involved in his private practice.
Nal Code of Conduct r. 1.11(d)(2) (2004); see In re Smith, 29 So.3d 1232,1236 (La. 2010) (suspension of counsel for violation of rule 1.11(d), inter alia, by maintaining the lawyer`s representation of the defendant once he was hired and while he was an assistant prosecutor in the same community). These conflicts – unlike those that arise in connection with a former government lawyer in private practice – are not attributed to different lawyers in the agency. However, the agency should always protect the lawyer from any involvement in the case. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Op. cit.
342 formal (1975). This article focuses on lawyers moving from public service to private practice. When a lawyer moves from public service to private practice, the essential provisions for the analysis of potential conflicts are paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 1.11. With deliberate simplification, I will reduce each of these three important paragraphs to its core. .